{
  "id": "oai:papers.qnfo.org:ball-first-strategies-as-evolutionarily-stable-policies-in-repeated-interactions",
  "slug": "ball-first-strategies-as-evolutionarily-stable-policies-in-repeated-interactions",
  "title": "Ball‑First Strategies as Evolutionarily Stable Policies in Repeated Interactions",
  "authors": [
    "Rowan Brad Quni-Gudzinas"
  ],
  "abstract": "Repeated strategic encounters—such as public debates, corporate negotiations, and online discussions—are frequently marred by personal attacks that raise coordination costs, erode trust, and impede long‑term cooperation. Existing literature treats “ball‑first” (issue‑directed) conduct as an ethical recommendation but lacks a formal game‑theoretic justification. We model the interaction as an infinitely repeated symmetric two‑strategy game that extends the classic Hawk‑Dove framework by adding a reputational penalty d for aggression against a cooperative opponent. Using discrete replicator dynamics with a one‑step delay, we derive a closed‑form evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) condition $d > V/2$, where V is the resource value. With the concrete parameterisation V=1, C=2, d=0.6, the numerical threshold d^*=0.5 is exceeded, confirming that ball‑first (B) is an ESS. Full arithmetic shows that the replicator equation drives the population toward x=1 (all B) for any initial mix, establishing global asymptotic stability. Sensitivity analysis reveals a bifurcation at d^*=0.5: modest reductions in d flip the stable strategy to person‑first (P). The result provides a quantitative lever—adjusting reputational costs—to promote issue‑focused behaviour in institutional design, moderation algorithms, and negotiation protocols.",
  "abstract_markdown": "Repeated strategic encounters—such as public debates, corporate negotiations, and online discussions—are frequently marred by personal attacks that raise coordination costs, erode trust, and impede long‑term cooperation. Existing literature treats “ball‑first” (issue‑directed) conduct as an ethical recommendation but lacks a formal game‑theoretic justification. We model the interaction as an infinitely repeated symmetric two‑strategy game that extends the classic Hawk‑Dove framework by adding a reputational penalty $d$ for aggression against a cooperative opponent. Using discrete replicator dynamics with a one‑step delay, we derive a closed‑form evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) condition $d > V/2$, where $V$ is the resource value. With the concrete parameterisation $V=1$, $C=2$, $d=0.6$, the numerical threshold $d^{*}=0.5$ is exceeded, confirming that ball‑first (B) is an ESS. Full arithmetic shows that the replicator equation drives the population toward $x=1$ (all B) for any initial mix, establishing global asymptotic stability. Sensitivity analysis reveals a bifurcation at $d^{*}=0.5$: modest reductions in $d$ flip the stable strategy to person‑first (P). The result provides a quantitative lever—adjusting reputational costs—to promote issue‑focused behaviour in institutional design, moderation algorithms, and negotiation protocols.",
  "date": "2026-10-21",
  "first_published": "2026-10-21",
  "last_revised": "2026-10-21T00:00:00Z",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T00:00:00Z",
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  "peer_review_status": "Not independently peer-reviewed",
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  "doi": null,
  "doi_url": null,
  "url": "https://papers.qnfo.org/papers/ball-first-strategies-as-evolutionarily-stable-policies-in-repeated-interactions",
  "license_url": "https://legal.qnfo.org/",
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  "sha256": "99046ecddd92374457b81b7b21287fe17ad8bd89819c4067baad8dcab19187bf",
  "version_url": "https://papers.qnfo.org/papers/ball-first-strategies-as-evolutionarily-stable-policies-in-repeated-interactions/v/1.0.0",
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    "titles": [
      {
        "title": "Ball‑First Strategies as Evolutionarily Stable Policies in Repeated Interactions"
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    "publisher": "QNFO",
    "publicationYear": "2026",
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